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The New Definition of Seniority System Violations
Under Title VII: "He Who Seeks Equity..
I. Introduction
A commonly preferred method of allocating work-related benefits
focuses on the length of the worker's employment with a given employer or
in a single department of the employer's operation, conferring the greater
portion of benefits on the more senior employees. Seniority rules thus
discriminate, but they may appear to do so on a reasonable basis and help to
forestall other less acceptable discrimination. Unions apparently favor them
because they limit employers' discretion. The cure, however, proves worse
than the disease when seniority works against women or minorities and
thereby prolongs the effects of earlier bias in hiring or promotional policies.
In some cases, the award of seniority credit is a permitted remedy1 under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,2 which condemns employment
discrimination on the basis of race, religion, color, sex, or natonal origin. 3
But the Title VII period of limitations is brief. Currently, one has 180 days
from the date of the discriminatory act, or its termination if the violation is
deemed "continuing," 4 to file charges with the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC).5 If after three months a discriminatory act is
beyond the reach of Title VII, a seniority system may lawfully preserve the
act's effects, unless a court finds that the system "continues" the wrongful
conduct. Last Term, the Supreme Court rejected a form of "continuing
violation" theory that had succeeded in all the circuits, holding that the
mere continuity under a seniority system of bias-related disadvantages does
not toll the Title VII period of limitations.6 For a claim to lie, the seniority
system must represent independent discriminatory action.7
1. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Corp., 424 U.S. 747, 762 (1976).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970).
4. See text accompanying notes 82-87 infra.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (Supp. V 1975). See text accompanying notes 94-96 infra.
6. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); United Air
Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
7. This states the requirement broadly. See text accompanying note 106 infra.
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As a consequence, many who may have benefited from the anti-
discrimination policy of Title VII may forfeit what they had gained.
8
Suppose, for example, that an employer refused a person a job for dis-
criminatory reasons, but hires him at a later date. The new employee's name
is thus lower on the seniority list than it would have been had the employer
not initially discriminated, and he will be laid off before other employees
who were hired after his first application for a job. If the employer's initial
discrimination occurred after the effective date of the Act,9 the discriminatee
could have filed EEOC charges then or as late as 180 days after entering
the culprit's employ. Even though a new employee might not realize the
consequences of the seniority disadavantage at the moment he or she enters
the work force, the limitations period would begin to run at that time unless
the seniority system itself, independently of the employer's past discrimina-
tory hiring policy, reflects a discriminatory purpose.
The Supreme Court's winnowing out of continuing-violation claims,
while ostensibly grounded in a close reading of the language and legislative
history of Title VII, 10 calls in question the balance struck by the lower courts
among the interests of discriminatees, other employees, unions, manage-
ment, and the government. What a discriminatee gains by an award of
seniority credit other employees lose; a question of reverse discrimination
may thus arise. When seniority credit is appropriate, a claim for damages
against the employer or union for back pay may also be appropriate; the
extension of the time period for asserting a seniority challenge thus increases
the employer's or union's potential liability."1 Moreover, judicial revision of
seniority lists may disturb collective bargaining relationships between un-
ions and employers that the labor laws were designed to foster and to
protect. 12 The less generous treatment of discriminatees may therefore have
support in considerations of equity and the national labor policy. This Note
will first deal with certain problems of interpretation posed by the Court's
most recent holdings, and then assess their policy ramifications in relation to
the issues just mentioned. It will appear that the new holdings are, at
best, crudely responsive to such considerations.
II. Legislative and Judicial Background
Section 703(h) of Title VII provides that an employer's operation of a
8. Stacy, Title VII Seniority Remedies in a Time of Economic Downturn, 28 VAND. L.
REv. 487 (1975); Note, Last Hired, First Fired Seniority, Layoffs and Title VII: Questions of
Liability and Remedy, 11 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 343 (1975).
9. July 2, 1965.
10. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 350-51 (1977).
11. The possible increase in back pay liability is, however, quite limited. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975).
12. See the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1970).
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seniority system is not in violation of the Act if the seniority system is bona
fide and if differences in treatment of employees under the system do not
result from an intention to discriminate. 13 "Bona fide" and "intention to
discriminate," however, are not defined, and while the section invites the
courts to shape a rule for the protection of some seniority systems, it offers
little guidance for the task. Accordingly, courts have strained to find
instruction in the legislative record.
The original House Bill included Title VII's present blanket prohibi-
tions against discrimination in the hiring and treatment of employees, but
did not specifically address seniority systems. 14 Since the purpose of a
seniority system is the orderly but disparate treatment of employees, a
distribution of seniority rights that treats one race, gender, or ethnic or
religious group less favorably than another would seem to violate Title VII's
basic prohibitions. There was nothing in the first version of the Bill con-
sidered by the House to contradict this impression. Critics brought up the
possibility that already-acquired seniority rights might be destroyed,"5 but
the Bill's proponents made no reply and when the Bill passed the House its
language was essentially unchanged.' 6
In response to similar criticism in the Senate, Senator Clark, majority
sponsor of the Bill, presented two interpretive memoranda, one prepared by
the Justice Department and another by himself and Senator Case, together
with written answers to questions submitted by Senator Dirksen. 17 All three
documents denied that existing seniority rights would be affected. In par-
ticular, the Clark-Case memorandum stated that the effect of the Bill would
be prospective and not retrospective.18 It was after a later meeting of Senate
leaders, however, that section 703(h) was added to the original bill. 19 No
formal debate took place concerning the addition. 20 Senators Dirksen2' and
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or
different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide
seniority or merit system, or a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality
of production or to employees who work in different locations, provided that such
differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin ....
14. See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1963).
15. Id. at 64-66, 71-72; 110 CONG. REC. 2726 (1964).
16. 110 CONG. REC. 2510-804(1964).
17. Id. at 7207, 7212, 7216.
18. Id. at 7213.
19. Id. at 11,935-36.
20. Representative McCulloch of Ohio, who supported the Bill's passage, stated just
before the final vote that it would not permit the destruction of already acquired seniority
rights. Id. at 15,893.
21. Id. at 11,935-37.
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Humphrey 22 stated that the changes, among which section 703(h) was only
one, were intended to clarify the bill. The earlier congressional debate and
comments have posed problems for courts and commentators interpreting
the final version of Title VII. 23
Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc.,24 an early district court decision,
became the leading case on the application of Title VII to seniority systems.
Philip Morris' seniority system had allocated most employment benefits
according to length of employment in a particular department within the
employer's plant, rather than according to length of employment with the
company. Departments in the plant were originally strictly segregated along
racial lines, although in the early 1960's a complex transfer system permit-
ted small numbers of black employees to move into formerly all-white
departments. Under this transfer system, only two transferees a year could
retain the seniority they had accumulated in their original job assignments;
others had to accept positions at the bottom of the seniority rosters of their
new departments. Until 1963, black and white workers belonged to separate
unions that negotiated distinctly unequal union contracts for the two groups.
Some or all of these facts about Philip Morris' seniority system led the court
to describe it as having "its genesis in racial discrimination. "2 Both Philip
Morris and the union contended that section 703(h) immunized the seniority
system from challenge under Title VII. But Judge Butzner concluded from
the legislative history of the section that while Congress did not contemplate
reverse discrimination, it nevertheless "did not intend to freeze an entire
generation of Negro employees into discriminatory patterns that existed
before the act.'"26 He held that a departmental seniority system is not "bona
fide" if it had its genesis in discrimination, and found an apparently distinct
reason to condemn the seniority system in that its differential treatment of
black and white employees resulted from the discriminatory intention be-
hind the company's hiring policies prior to the effective date of Title VII. 27
Subsequently, every circuit court of appeals examining the issue agreed
with the main principle of Quarles, that a facially neutral employment
practice is not protected by section 703(h) if it preserves the effects of prior
discrimination. 28 Many of the cases dealt, as Quarles had, with attacks on
22. Id. at 12,707.
23. See generally, Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing under Fair Employment Laws: A
General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring andPromotion, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1598, 1607-
14 (1969); Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 431 (1966),
24. 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
25. Id. at 517.
26. Id. at 516.
27. Id. at 517-18.
28. Significantly, even courts that accepted functionally equivalent versions of the Quarles
principle as applied to seniority systems did so on the basis of apparently different readings of
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seniority systems. 29 More than a few of those cases concerned the seniority
system's preservation of disadvantages resulting from pre-Act discrimina-
§ 703(h). The following peculiarities of their interpretations illustrate the diversity of views the
courts have appended to the Quarles principle. First, the Second and Fourth Circuits spoke of a
seniority system's preservation of the effects of prior discrimination as a "continuing viola-
tion" of Title VII. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971);
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971). The Bethlehem Steel court stated that
a seniority system's role in such a continuing violation was incompatible with the bona fides
requirement for protection under § 703(h). 446 F.2d 661. Since this Second Circuit decision
relied in part on Quarles, it appears to offer a reinterpretation of Quarles' statement that a
seniority system with its genesis in discrimination is never bona fide: Quarles had not made the
issue of the seniority system's bona fides turn in any way on the system's preservation of
disadvantages although this factor was considered as a separate ground for finding a violation.
Second, the seniority systems examined in Quarles and later circuit opinions were, without
exception, facially neutral. By implication, all federal courts that had dealt with discrimination-
preserving seniority systems considered facial neutrality insufficient to establish bona fides.
The Eighth Circuit made this explicit, stating that such a seniority system, "although neutral on
its face. . rejuvenates the past discrimination in both fact and law regardless of present good
faith." Marquez v. Omaha Dist. Sales Office, Ford Div., 440 F.2d 1157, 1160 (8th Cir.
1971). This may be taken to mean either that the employer's present good faith does not make
his advancement policy bona fide or that even a bona fide policy may have consequences that
result from a past intention to discriminate. Third, the cases rarely distinguish the questions of
bona fides and presence of discriminatory intent; yet they must be read in the light of similarly
reasoned cases that do draw the distinction. E.g., United States v. N.L. Indus. Inc., 479 F.2d
354, 360-61 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 659 (2d Cir.
1971); Marquez v. Omaha Dist. Sales Office, Ford Div., 440 F.2d 1157, 1160 (8th Cir. 1971).
Last, Judge Butzner, the author of Quarles, intimated a different view of the Quarles principle
in a later opinion, stating that a combination of discrimination in pre-Act'hiring and present
restrictions on transfer between formerly segregated departments "depicts a present pattern of
discrimination." United States v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 471 F.2d 582, 590 (4th Cir. 1972).
See United States v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structuial & Ornamental Iron Workers,
Local 1, 438 F.2d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 1971); Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v.
United States, 416 F.2d 980, 995-97 (5th Cir. 1969). It is impossible to be certain whether these
cases use the term "pattern" merely as a synonym for violation or as a label for a special kind
of violation. All three were "pattern or practice" suits, i.e., suits brought by the United States
Attorney General under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1970), so that a court might refer to the alleged
offense as a "pattern of discrimination." On the other hand, the requirement that in order to
maintain a claim of continuing violation plaintiff must allege a "pattern" of like wrongful
conduct is common in cases not involving the "pattern or practice" elements or seniority
system preservation of the effects of prior discrimination. See text accompanying notes 84-87
infra.
Despite these minor variations in rationale, the cases have formed a "unanimous body of
authority" for the proposition that preservation of the effects of prior discrimination violates
Title VII. Local 104, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 439 F.2d 237, 243 (9th Cir.
1971). See also Heard v. Mueller Co., 464 F.2d 190, 193 (6th Cir. 1972).
29. See, e.g., Acha v. Beame, 531 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1976); Nance v. Union Carbide Corp.,
540 F.2d 718 (4th Cir. 1976); Swint v. Pullman Standard, 539 F.2d 72 (5th Cir. 1976); Gibson v.
Longshoremen Local 40, 543 F.2d 1259 (9th Cir. 1976); Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 508
F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1975); EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975); Rogers v.
International Paper Co., 510 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir.), vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1975); Waters v.
Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974); Jones v. Lee Way
Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971).
Some cases relying on Quarles did not deal with seniority systems. See, e.g., United States
v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 456 F.2d
112 (5th Cir. 1972); Contractors' Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971);
United States v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, Local
No. 1, 438 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1971).
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tion. 30 Even the Supreme Court's discussion of a facially neutral employ-
ment test in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.31 echoed Quarles' observation that
Congress did not intend to freeze pre-Act discriminatory patterns.
Quarles left open, however, the scope of the remedy to be applied
when an employer has unlawfully discriminated in its pre-Act hiring. Spe-
cifically, courts have reached different conclusions about the propriety of
remedies adjusting "company" and "departmental" seniority. The distinc-
tion between company and departmental seniority is common in collective
bargaining agreements.32 An employee's company seniority continues to
accumulate with his or her service in the bargaining unit covered by the
seniority system, regardless of the employee's transfers or promotions
during that period of employment. Departmental seniority, on the other
hand, is lost with transfer from one department to another, and the transferee
begins again in the least favorable position on the seniority roster of the new
department. 33 The Fifth Circuit in Local 189, United Papermakers & Pa-
perworkers v. United States34 reasoned that while it would be appropriate to
award departmental seniority equal to a discriminatee's company seniority
after a remedial transfer, a person hired belatedly as a result of previous
hiring discrimination could not be granted "fictional" seniority credit back
to the time when he would have been hired in the absence of discrimination.
Suggesting that fictional seniority assignments constituted preferential treat-
30. United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1977); Acha v. Beame, 531 F.2d
648 (2d Cir. 1976); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974); Bing v.
Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry.
Co., 471 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1972); United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5th
Cir. 1971); Long v. Georgia Kraft Co., 450 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1971); Local No. 104, Sheet Metal
Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 439 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. National Lead Co.,
438 F. 2d 935 (8th Cir. 1971); Taylor v. Armco Steel Corp., 429 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1970); Local
189, United Papermakers and Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969);
United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local No. 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969).
31. 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
32. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Corp., 424 U.S. 747, 766-68 (1976).
33. The practical basis for the distinction lies in the nature of the employment benefits to be
allocated according to seniority. Some of these benefits, such as vacation rights and medical
and pension benefits, are among those "terms and conditions of employment" that are manda-
tory subjects of collective bargaining under the Taft-Hartley Act. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970); see
Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964). A union may charge an employer
with the unfair labor practice of refusing to bargain in good faith if the employer fails to
consider. proposals concerning such subjects. The supply, if not the allocation, of other
important employment benefits such as priority for promotion, immunity from layoff, priority
for recall, and shift opportunities, remains exclusively within the employer's prerogative.
During collective bargaining, an employer is not required to entertain union proposals concern-
ing the amount, size, or frequency of such benefits. Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers v.
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971). Seniority for these benefits is competitive in
.the sense that employees compete for them and the union can do nothing to increase their
availability. Seniority for these scarce benefits is usually assigned on a departmental basis,
while company seniority controls other benefits.
34. 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969).
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ment35 and perhaps reverse discrimination,3 6 the court repeated Quarles'
observation that nothing in the legislative history of Title VII indicated an
intention to immunize departmental seniority systems. 37 In the Fifth Cir-
cuit's view, the implication was that the exception embodied in section
703(h) did not apply to departmental seniority but prohibited the courts from
assigning retroactive seniority as a remedy for discrimination when a dis-
criminatee has not accumulated equivalent company seniority. 38 The Third
and Seventh Circuits accepted this reasoning, 39 but the Sixth Circuit held
that while the facts of each case should be carefully considered, Title VII
does not prohibit such "superseniority" assignments. 4°
The United States Supreme Court first granted certiorari in a Title VII
seniority case to examine the Fifth Circuit's rule against the "fictional
seniority" remedy. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Corp.41 presented
several claims, including minority employees' claims for retroactive seniori-
ty based on allegations that the employer had refused to hire them for
discriminatory reasons after Title VII was in force. The district court had
refused such relief, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.42 Reasserting the princi-
ple of Local 189, it stated that once a seniority system is established, an
employer's subsequent discriminatory refusal to hire does not extinguish the
system's bona fides; accordingly, section 703(h) applies. 43 The Supreme
Court rejected this reasoning as "clearly erroneous. 44 The Court's opinion
drew attention to a distinction that had eluded the lower federal judiciary:
while section 703(h) states that the operation of a seniority system under
certain circumstances does not violate Title VII, it implies no restriction on
section 706(g), the Title's provision on remedies. 45 In Albemarle Paper Co.
35. Title VII expressly stops short of requiring preferential treatment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(j) (1970).
36. 416 F.2d at 994-95.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 995.
39. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Local 327, Elec. Workers, 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir.
1975); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974).
40. Meadows v. Ford Motor Co., 510 F.2d 939 (6th Cir. 1975).
41. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
42. 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. 7367 (N.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd, 495 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 424
U.S. 747 (1976).
43. 495 F.2d at 417.
44. 424 U.S. at 757.
45. Id. at 758-59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975) provides in pertinent part:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally
engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may
enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order
such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited
to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay (payable by the
employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible
for the unlawful employment practice), or any other equitable relief as the court deems
appropriate.
307
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v. Moody, 46 the Court had stated that a central purpose of Title VII is to
"make [victims of discrimination] whole." 4 7 Franks made it clear that
remedies that include the award of retroactive seniority may therefore be
appropriate for any violation, including discriminatory refusal to hire.48
Franks' distinction botween violation and remedy is based on the fact
that section 703(h) appears only to define what is and is not an unlawful
employment practice with regard to seniority systems' post-Act preservation
of the effects of pre-Act discrimination.4 9 Because the precise issue pre-
sented in Franks concerned only the appropriate remedy, the effect of that
definition on seniority system challenges was beyond the scope of the case,
land the majority said nothing to indicate that its understanding of the
provision would contradict the settled law of the lower courts on what
constitutes a violation of Title VII. It was possible to suppose, as the
Seventh Circuit did in Evans v. United Air Lines, Inc.,1° that after Franks
retroactive seniority relief was proper whenever a seniority system gave
continuing effect to earlier discrimination, without regard to the dis-
criminatee's time spent on the job.
That misperception underscores the importance of the partly concur-
ring, partly dissenting views expressed by three members of the Franks
Court.51 In a brief opinion, Chief Justice Burger stated his opposition to
competitive seniority relief in all but the most exceptional circumstances,
preferring a "front pay" monetary award as more equitable. He charac-
terized the kind of relief approved by the majority as "robbing Peter to pay
Paul" in complete disregard of "the rights of innocent employees" whose
seniority status would suffer by the award of seniority credit to others, and
suggested that these innocent employees might have claims for equitable
relief on their own behalf. 52 Justice Powell, with the concurrence of the
Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist, noted his "agreement" with the major-
ity that section 703(h) "[insulates] an otherwise bona fide seniority system
from a challenge that it amounts to a discriminatory practice because it
perpetuates the effects of pre-Act discrimination." 5 3 He went on to stress
46. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
47. Id. at 418.
48. 424 U.S. at 779.
49. Id. at 761.
50. 534 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 431 U.S. 533 (1977).
51. -Justice Stevens did not take part in Franks.
52. 424 U.S. at 780-81.
53. Id. at 781. This statement is considerably stronger than its counterpart in the majority
opinion:
[I]t is apparent that the thrust of [section 703(h)] is directed toward defining what is
and what is not an illegal discriminatory practice in instances in which the post-Act
operation of a seniority system is challenged as perpetuating the effects of discrimina-
tion occurring prior to the effective date of the Act.
Id. at 761.
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the difference between "benefit" -type and "competitive" -type seniority
relief in order to contrast their equitable significance. 54 While the employer
pays for the former, other "innocent" employees pay for the latter. Accord-
ingly, Justice Powell argued that "normal equitable considerations" 55 as
well as the advice against preferential treatment in section 703(j)56 should
prevent courts that apply section 706(g) from automatically awarding
competitive seniority to discriminatees who had lost the opportunity to
acquire it. Instead, the courts should fashion competitive-seniority remedies
for individual cases in the light of the impact on other employees. 57 The
dissenting portions of the separate opinions in Franks foreshadowed the
Supreme Court's more recent construction of section 703(h).
III. Last Term's Decisions
Although Franks professed to deal only with the remedial aspect of
seniority system challenges under Title VII, the Court has now spoken
concerning the violation aspect in two closely related decisions. While
Franks seemed to weaken the resistance of seniority systems to the antidis-
crimination law, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States58
and United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans59 reassure certain seniority systems of
significant immunity under section 703(h).
A. The pre-Act discriminatees' seniority challenge
The cornerstone of the two decisions is the Teamsters holding that
section 703(h) protects facially neutral seniority systems that do not provide
54. "Benefit"-type seniority refers to the use of a worker's earned seniority credits in
computing his level of economic fringe benefits. Examples of such benefits are pensions, paid
vacation time, and unemployment insurance. "Competitive"-type seniority refers to the use of
those same earned credits in determining his right, relative to other workers, to job-related
"rights" that cannot be supplied equally to any two employees. Examples range from the
worker's right to keep his job while someone else is laid off, to his right to a place in the punch-
out line ahead of another employee at the end of a workday. Id. at 782 n. 1.
55. Id. at 785.
56. Id. at 792. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer,
employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee subject
to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group
because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group
on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or
percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by
any employer, referred or classified for employment by any employment agency or
labor organization, admitted to membership or classified by any labor organization, or
admitted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship or other training program, in compari-
son with the total number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin in any community, State, section, or other area, or in the available
work force in any community, State, section, or other area.
57. 424 U.S. at 795.
58. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
59. 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
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for adjustment in the seniority assignments of pre-Act discriminatees. 60
Teamsters was the consolidation of two class actions brought by the United
States Attorney General on behalf of black and Spanish-surnamed individ-
uals, charging a nationwide common carrier, T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., and the
Teamsters, who represent a large group of that company's employees, with
discriminatory employment practices. 61 Jobs with T.I.M.E.-D.C. were tra-
ditionally divided into four categories, of which "over-the-road" (OTR) or
long-distance drivers were the best paid. The complaints alleged that mem-
bers of the specified minorities were hired only into less desirable, lower
paying positions and were not allowed to transfer into OTR positions
without loss of departmental seniority, while others were hired directly into
OTR positions and could accumulate departmental seniority from the begin-
ning of their employment. 62 After a partial resolution of the dispute estab-
lishing an affirmative action recruiting program, 63 the issues remaining be-
fore the district court were whether the minority employees had suffered
from unlawful employment practices, and if so, the extent and nature of the
appropriate remedy.64 The district court found that all incumbent black and
Spanish-surnamed employees at T.I.M.E.-D.C. terminals with OTR opera-
tions had been victims of discrimination and ordered that they be given
priority in filling OTR vacancies, subject to the prior recall rights of
previously laid-off OTR employees. 65 The class of discriminatees was
divided, however, into three groups according to the court's ranking of the
severity of individual injuries. 66 The decree provided retroactive seniority
upon transfer to only two of these groups and subordinated the transfer
priority of the groups one to the other. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found
fault with this division, and construed the trial court's decree as misunder-
standing the demand for proof of injury in "pattern or practice" actions
60. 431 U.S. at 353. Significantly, the Court formulated the issue as follows: "whether §
703(h) validates otherwise bona fide seniority systems that afford no constructive seniority to
victims discriminated against prior to the effective date of Title VII." Id. at 348.
61. United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 517 F.2d 299, 303 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated and
remanded sub nom. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). The
district court opinion is unofficially reported at 6 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6148 (N.D. Tex. 1973).
62. 517 F.2d at 307.
63. T.I.M.E.-D.C., without admitting to the discriminatory employment practices,
consented to entry of a decree requiring it to establish an affirmative action recruiting program.
Id. at 306. The partial decree is reported at 4 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6144 (N.D. Tex. 1972).
64. 517 F.2d at 307.
65. Id. at 309.
66. Id. The decree divided the affected class into the following groups: Group A consisted
of 30 individuals who "produced the most convincing evidence of discrimination and harm
resulting therefrom"; Group B consisted of four individuals who "were very possibly the
objects of discrimination and . . . were likely harmed by such discrimination"; Group C
consisted of over three hundred individuals who "either presented no evidence of discrimina-
tion against themselves and resulting harm or [were] no longer in the employ of TIME." Id.
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under Title VII.67 While proof of individual injury is essential for injunctive
relief in an individual plaintiff's Title VII suit, the purpose of Attorney
General suits under section 707(a) is to vindicate the rights of an entire class
when an employer has engaged in more than occasional or sporadic acts of
discrimination. 68 The court of appeals remanded with instructions that the
trial court abandon the threefold division of the affected class. 69
The Supreme Court granted certiorari. Its holding turned on an issue
the parties had not briefed. Several Title VII decisions by the Court,
especially Griggs v. Duke Power Co., had stressed that the Act condemns
not only overtly discriminatory employment practices, but also other prac-
tices that have discriminatory effects even if "neutral on their face and in
intent." '70 This second category clearly includes practices that preserve the
effects of past discrimination. 71 It would seem to follow, as even the Court
conceded, that the seniority system challenged in Teamsters violated Title
VII, 72 but the Court asserted that section 703(h) sets seniority systems
apart 73 and concluded that mere seniority disadvantages resulting from pre-
Act discrimination will not support a Title VII complaint. 74
67. Id. at 319.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 321.
70. 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 422, 425
(1975); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.14 (1973).
71. 431 U.S. at 349.
72. See id. at 349-50.
73. Id. at 350. The Clark-Case and Justice Department memoranda, which belong to the
phase of Senate debate before the addition of section 703(h), stated that the bill would not make
it necessary to assign recently hired blacks "special seniority rights at the expense of the white
workers hired earlier," 110 CONG. REC. 7231 (1964), and that the last hired, first fired rule
central to many seniority systems would not be affected, even if whites had more seniority than
blacks as a result of pre-Act discrimination, id. at 7207. These remarks might be construed to
mean only that persons refused jobs on discriminatory grounds should not be slotted into better
positions on a seniority roster than others who had earned their positions there. But Franks
implied that nothing ought to turn on whether the discrimination that lead to seniority disadvan-
tages consisted of discriminatory job assignments or discriminatory refusal to hire. See text
accompanying notes 41-42 supra.
74. 431 U.S. at 353-54. In the Court's view, the relevance of the Clark-Case and Justice
Department memoranda to section 703(h) was confirmed by the comments of Senators Dirksen
and Humphrey that section 703(h) was intended to resolve ambiguities of the original Bill. The
Court reasoned that this precludes interpreting the final version of Title VII as increasing
governmental interference with seniority systems. Id. at 352. The lower courts' view that a
seniority system's preservation of pre-Act discrimination is unlawful would "disembowel"
section 703(h). Id. at 353. The opinion goes on to brush aside arguments against the new reading
of the section that are based on other passages from the legislative history. Id. at 354 n.39. The
footnote refers to Franks' argument that since in 1972 Congress added the words "other
equitable relief" to section 706(g), and since an accompanying Senate report stressed the
existing "earnings gap" between white and black workers and described the correct approach
as one providing a "rightful place" to former discriminatees, "rightful place seniority, implicat-
ing an employee's future earnings, job security, and advancement prospects, is absolutely
essential to obtaining this congressionally mandated goal." (emphasis in original) 424 U.S. at
764 n.21. "Rightful place" is the phrase the Fifth Circuit coined to describe its approach to the
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Up to this point, the Court had merely rejected the Government's
continuing violation theory. That rejection raises the additional problem of
determining whether, on the evidence, the T.I.M.E.-D.C. seniority system
satisfies the requirements for section 703(h) protection in other respects. In
this connection Teamsters makes its only concession to the views of the
lower courts, deferring to Quarles' rule that a seniority system that has its
genesis in discrimination cannot be bona fide.75 Nevertheless, the Court
concluded that since the T.I.M.E.-D.C. seniority system was neutral in
operation and there was no allegation that it had its genesis in discrimina-
tion, the Government's charges on behalf of the minority employees hired
before the effective date of Title VII failed to state a claim.
76
B. The Ambiguous Link between Evans and Teamsters
Carolyn Evans was a flight attendant with United Air Lines. A
company rule required female flight attendants to resign if they married, and
after her marriage in 1968 Evans was forced to resign. United soon dropped
the rule, and shortly thereafter, Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc. declared
that the rule had violated Title VII. 7 7 Under a collective bargaining agree-
ment executed within a year of Evans' resignation, all those in her position
who had filed charges with the EEOC or grievances with the union could
claim reinstatement if they wished.7 8 Evans was neither a party in Sprogis
nor a grievant. She filed EEOC charges in 1972 when, after repeated
informal requests for reinstatement, United took her on as a new employee.
She then brought a Title VII action for back pay and her original position on
the seniority roster. The district court dismissed the claim as barred under
Title VII's then ninety-day limitation of claims. 79 The Seventh Circuit at
first agreed, then reversed unanimously on rehearing, under the influence of
the intervening Franks decision. 80 The Supreme Court held that the trial
court had properly dismissed the complaint. 81
remedy aspect of seniority cases. Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United
States, 416 F.2d 980, 988 (5th Cir. 1969). The Teamsters footnote dismisses the argument that
Congress had approved the lower courts' continuing violation approach to seniority cases on
the grounds that the legislative history of the 1972 amendments "is itself susceptible of
different readings," and that since the amendments did not affect section 703(h), the views of
members of the later Congress should not be considered in interpreting that section. 431 U.S. at
354 n.39.
75. 431 U.S. at 346 n.28, 356.
76. Id. at 356.
77. 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
78. Evans v. United Air Lines, Inc., 534 F.2d 1247, 1248 n.2 (7th Cir. i976), rev'd, 431 U.S.
553 (1977).
79. Id. at 1248.
80. Evans v. United Air Lines, Inc., 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6810 (7th Cir.), rev'd per curiam
on rehearing, 534 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
81. 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
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Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens discussed Evans' claim as if it
were clearly analogous to the Teamsters claim on behalf of pre-Act dis-
criminatees.82 This approach was not inevitable, nor are its implications
obvious. An appreciation of the problems this approach raises must begin
with some distinctions concerning what the courts have indiscriminately
called "continuing violations."
Most discriminatory acts affecting employees or applicants for employ-
ment have significant continuing effects in that the discriminatees are
deprived, over time, of employment benefits they would otherwise enjoy.
The obvious types of ostensibly isolated managerial decisions that can cause
long-term injuries are refusal to hire, discharge, and denial of transfer or
promotion opportunities. Nothing in Title VII expressly precludes continu-
ing violation claims based on these or any other form of discrimination, and
indeed section 706(g) on remedies implies that continuing violation claims
may be asserted. 83 It should be apparent from these examples that the
operation of a seniority system need not figure in a putative continuing
violation.
The significance of alleging a continuing violation is that the relatively
brief period for filing charges under Title VII does not begin to run until the
violation has terminated. Lower federal courts have frequently acknowl-
edged this principle. 84 The general view has been that a discriminatory act,
standing alone, does not constitute a continuing violation regardless of the
duration of the act's consequences; 85 but a pattern of discriminatory acts will
support a continuing violation claim, even when the plaintiff has suffered
from only one such act.86 Although no court has thus far permitted the
82. See text accompanying notes 52-76 supra.
83. The section provides in part that "[black pay liability shall not accrue from a date more
than two years prior to the filing of a charge with the Commission." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)
(Supp. V 1975).
84. See, e.g., cases cited in note 86 infra.
85. Marlowe v. Fisher Body, 489 F.2d 1057, 1063 (6th Cir. 1973); Macklin v. Spector
Freight Sys., Inc., 478 F.2d 979, 986-88 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Bartmess v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc.,
444 F.2d 1186, 1188 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971).
86. Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011
(1975) (sex-based discriminatory hiring and promotion policy grounded continuing violation
class action); Marlowe v. Fisher Body, 489 F.2d 1057,1063 (6th Cir. 1973) (continuous series of
promotion decisions, one of which affected plaintiff, is a continuing violation); Macklin v.
Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 478 F.2d 979, 987-88 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (conspiracy between employer
and union to discriminate in hiring is a continuing violation); Belt v. Johnson Motor Lines, Inc.,
458 F.2d 443, 445 (5th Cir. 1972) (series of refusals to recurring oral request for promotion may
ground a continuing violation claim); Bartmess v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186, 1188
(7th Cir.) (gender-based discriminatory retirement policy grounded EEOC charges four months
before plaintiff was forced to retire), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971); Cox v. United States
Gypsum Co., 409 F.2d 289, 290 (7th Cir. 1969) (charges filed more than 90 days after dis-
criminatory layoff were timely since further discriminatory acts took place after those com-
plained of). The Supreme Court gave indirect approval to such continuing violation theories in
the § 1981 case of Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454,462 (1975): "[I]n the
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theory of continuing violation with regard to a discharge, 87 discriminatory
discharges are usually isolated expressions of bias, accompanied perhaps by
discrimination in other employment practices, but unlikely to figure in the
wholesale firing of a victim class.
Having stressed that plaintiff alleged a "continuing violation," the
Evans opinion stated, ominously for future Title VII plaintiffs, that "mere
continuity" is insignificant absent a "present violation." 88 Yet plaintiff's
theory, as presented to the Court in Evans, was not at all typical of
continuing violation claims. If plaintiff ever meant to argue that United was
actionably culpable without intermission from the time of her forced dis-
charge to the time she brought suit, that contention had disappeared before
the case reached the appellate level. 89 By the end of trial her apparent view
of the violation was that it started with her forced resignation, ceased at
some early date, and then revived when United took her on as a new
employee. 90 The trial court described Evans' claim as being based on the
supposed "resuscitation" of a past violation.91
Without deciding whether discriminatory discharge is a continuing
violation, the Court could have ruled that while continuing violations are
possible, later acts never resuscitate a terminated violation. Alternatively,
the Court could have held that although resuscitation is possible, United's
mere refusal to reinstate plaintiff's original seniority on rehiring her was not
enough to resuscitate the wrong in question here. But the question whether
discriminatory discharge is a continuing violation was not properly before
the Court;92 this fact and the absence of any direct statement about that issue
absence of some circumstance that suspended the running of the limitation period, petitioner's
[claim of discriminatory discharge] was barred .... "
87. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975); King v. Seaboard Coast
Line R.R., 538 F.2d 581 (4th Cir. 1976); Collins v. United Air Lines, Inc., 514 F.2d 594 (9th Cir.
1975); Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co., 511 F.2d 1228 (8th Cir. 1975); Phillips v. Columbia
Gas, 474 F.2d 1342 (4th Cir. 1973), aff'g mem., 347 F. Supp. 533 (S.D. W. Va. 1972).
88. 431 U.S. at 558 (emphasis in original).
89. While the original complaint requested seniority credit from the date of plaintiff's initial
employment and back pay "lost as a result of [United's] discriminatory employment prac-
tices," id. at 558 n.8, the trial court did not consider the theory that her claim of forced
resignation was never barred. See note 97 infra. At any rate, in her brief to the Supreme Court,
plaintiff specifically requested only reinstatement of her original seniority assignment together
with an increment of back pay to the date of her return to United's employ.
90. 431 U.S. at 558 nn.7 & 8.
91. Id. at n.9.
92. Contrary to this analysis, the EEOC Interprets Evans to hold "only that discharges are
not continuing violations." EEOC Interpretive Memorandum, July 12, 1977, 2 EMPL. PRAC.
GUIDE (CCH) 1 5029. This interpretation is apparently more restrictive than the Court's in
Teamsters and Justice Marshall's dissenting opinions in both cases. 431 U.S. at 377, 560. The
EEOC's reading of Evans agrees with the majority view of the lower federal courts concerning
discriminatory discharge. See note 94 supra. Yet if the Court had restricted itself to the issue of
discriminatory discharge it would have overlooked the distinguishing feature of Evans' claim,
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seem to confine the Court's intended advice on continuing violation claims
to the unusual class that Evans' claim exemplifies.
The idiosyncracy of Evans' claim calls into question the reasoning by
which the Evans opinion linked its result to the Teamsters holding regard-
ing pre-Act discriminatees. In a crucial passage, 93 Justice Stevens found the
admittedly continuing impact of plaintiff's seniority assignment insufficient
to support a Title VII claim on the basis of two unsupported and unex-
plained premises: first, the employer was "entitled" to regard its past
discriminatory act as lawful after Evans failed to file EEOC charges with-
in the limitations period; 94 and second, once time had barred a claim based
on the discriminatory discharge, the discharge became the "legal equiva-
lent" of pre-Act discrimination. 95
It is well to consider the second premise carefully. With it Justice
Stevens asserted an analogy between Evans' claim and the claim on behalf
of the pre-Act discriminatees in Teamsters. The remainder of the Evans
opinion found section 703(h) dispositive, 96 without adverting to the atypical
character of the claim of continuing violation that was before the Court. In
particular, Justice Stevens apparently alluded to section 703(h) in comment-
ing on Evans' failure to charge the seniority- system with a lack of neu-
trality97 or to claim that the system had deterred her from asserting a right
granted by Title VII. 98 On these grounds, the Court held that the complaint's
allegations failed to make out a claim.
But the coordination of the holdings of Evans and Teamsters depends
on conceptual sleight. Teamsters did not deal with charges of continuing
violation. The claims brought on behalf of the post-Act discriminatees were
timely by any reckoning, and the claims brought for the pre-Act dis-
criminatees proceeded on the theory that a seniority system's preservation of
pre-Act discrimination constitutes an original violation. Despite this, the
Le., her "resuscitation" theory. It seems clear, then, that the EEOC misconstrued Evans to the
extent of ignoring the Court's ruling on the resuscitation theory. The better view is that the
affirmative holding the Court imputed to Evans is simply not there. As to the latter point,
however, the Court had already intimated in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421
U.S. 454, 462 (1975), that discharges are not continuing violations. The lower federal courts
already apply that rule, see note 86 supra, and the limitations policy served by it is comparative-
ly secure from challenge.
93. 431 U.S. at 558.
94. See note 92 supra. The opinion does not indicate when the limitations period began to
run.
95. The exact words are: "A discriminatory act which is not made the basis for a timely
charge is the legal equivalent of a discriminatory act which occurred before the statute was
passed." 431 U.S. at 558.
96. Id. at 558 n.10.
97. Id. at 558.
98. Id. at 558n.10.
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Evans reasoning implies that Teamsters and Evans stand for a single
proposition: the mere "continuing impact'' 99 of seniority assignments linked
with pre-Act discrimination or unlawful discrimination not timely chal-
lenged is not a violation. Mere continuity of seniority disadvantages, then,
is irrelevant in determining whether a continuing violation exists. Almost all
forms of employment discrimination have a continuing impact on their
victims, and except in seniority cases-such has been the influence of
Quarles and Local 189-courts have unhesitatingly given less weight to
such continuity than to the clearly expressed Title VII policy in favor of
limiting the life of claims. Justice Stevens' unnecessary reliance on Team-
sters in his ipse dixit about the legal equivalence of Evans' forced res-
ignation and pre-Act discrimination, forces Evans into the mold that will
support the Court's new-found rule: continuing impact alone is no more
indicative of continuing violation in seniority cases than in other cases
involving continuing violation claims.
C. Bona fides and Absence of Discriminatory Intent
The new construction of section 703(h) evidently disallows many
seniority system challenges that previously would have succeeded in lower
courts. But while Teamsters and Evans warned that this would be so, indicat-
ing clearly that the mere continuity of a seniority system's impact should not
preclude a section 703(h) exemption, they refrained from an express deline-
ation of the substantive concepts of bona fides and intent to discriminate.
The Court's advice in this regard was written into its assessment of the
United Airlines and T.I.M.E.-D.C. seniority systems.
Teamsters found that the challenged seniority system was bona fide
and free from discriminatory purpose. 100 The significant facts mentioned by
the Court were as follows: the seniority system applied equally to all
employees in that the departmental seniority rosters impeded other employ-
ees, as well as black and Mexican-American employees, from transferring
into other departments; departmental rosters were traditional in the industry
and consistent with the precedents of National Labor Relations Board; the
seniority system did not have its genesis in discrimination; and the defend-
ants neither negotiated nor maintained the seniority system with a dis-
criminatory purpose. The phrase "genesis in discrimination" alluded to the
opinion's earlier approval of an aspect of the Quarles holding,' 0 ' but this
allusion presents an interpretive puzzle. In Quarles, Judge Butzner found
that Philip Morris' seniority system was not bona fide because it had its
99. Id. at 558.
100. 431 Ui.S. at 355-56.
101. See text accompanying note 75 supra.
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genesis in discrimination and, apparently as a separate matter, found that the
disparate impact of the system on black and white employees resulted from
an intention to discriminate as represented by the company's assignment of
employees to segregated departments prior to 1966.1° Since Teamsters
made it clear that preservation of the effects of pre-Act discrimination alone
is insufficient to put a seniority system in violation of the Act, the Court's
agreement with Quarles appears confined to the principle that a genesis in
discrimination is incompatible with bona fides. In a footnote to the Team-
sters opinion, however, Justice Stewart explained that a seniority system
may have its genesis in discrimination if an intention to discriminate
"[enters] into its very adoption." 103 It seems to follow that the Court
believed that a genesis in discrimination is sufficient to make a seniority
system fail both tests for section 703(h) protection, since an intention to
discriminate is necessary for such a genesis, which is in turn sufficient to
destroy bona fides. In the passage summarized above, Justice Stewart
assayed the bona fides of the T.I.M.E.-D.C. seniority system by examining
its neutrality and similarity to other NLRB-approved seniority systems in the
industry. Thus, a system's lack of bona fides may appear from a lack of
neutrality, a deviation from what is customary and in accord with national
labor policy, or a genesis in discrimination. The second criterion might
remove a seniority system's putative section 703(h) protection on purely
classificational grounds by showing it not to be a seniority system at all. All
three criteria, however, can evince a present discriminatory purpose. Even
genesis in discrimination, though it involves the past discriminatory intent
that entered into the adoption of the seniority system, may indicate present
wrongful intent since the maintenance of a seniority system originally
adopted for a discriminatory purpose suggests a current discriminatory
scheme. Accordingly,the Teamsters reading of section 703(h) did not imply
separate tests for bona fides and the relevant sort of intention to discrimi-
nate.
Evans applied only the neutrality test to United's seniority system, and
thus added nothing to Teamsters." The reason for the simplification in
Evans was apparently that on the facts presented there the system could not
otherwise have lost the protection of section 703(h). 105
The tests applied in the two cases point to a rigorous standard of proof
of discriminatory intent. 106 On one extreme, a seniority system that fails the
102. 279 F. Supp. at 517.
103. 431 U.S. at 346 n.28.
104. 431 U.S. at 558.
105. Id. at 558 n.10.
106. This interpretation is supported by an aside in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,
432 U.S. 63 (1977); "Here. . . the operation of the seniority system itself is said to violate Title
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neutrality test is overtly discriminatory, quite apart from any other dis-
criminatory employment practice; on the other, a seniority system that gives
present effect to a past act of discrimination may nevertheless be immune to
challenge. A successful challenge will therefore require proof of events that
specifically render the adoption or maintenance of the seniority system
suspicious. As Teamsters' partial approval of Quarles indicated, circum-
stances surrounding the inception of a seniority system may show dis-
criminatory purpose even absent such direct evidence as statements by the
defendant employer or union that discrimination was intended. The relevant
factors are as follows: a previous history of segregated unions, of different
pay scales for the same work, or of prohibition of transfer between depart-
ments with overwhelmingly racial identities; the institution of a departmen-
tal seniority system based on the separate seniority rosters of formerly
separate unions for minority and majority employees; and artifically restric-
tive rules for transfer between departments. A court must weigh these
factors, however, in much the same way that it would weigh circumstantial
evidence of intent on the part of an alleged tortfeasor.10 7
It should be clear from the facts of Teamsters that discriminatory
purpose will not be inferred from disparate impact. Even if all members of a
protected class bear a greater burden under a seniority system, the system is
immune if it applies equally in the sense that others are also burdened and
the system's operation is neutral. A court might not consider a facially
neutral seniority rule sufficiently neutral if it reserves substantial discretion
to the employer and there are statistically disproportionate adverse conse-
quences for women or minorities. 108
An analogy can be drawn between the new interpretation of section
703(h) and the constitutional rule of equal protection announced in Wash-
VII. In such circumstances, § 703(h) unequivocally mandates that there is no statutory violation
in the absence of a showing of discriminatory purpose. See United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431
U.S. 553, 558-60 (1977)." 432 U.S. at 82 n.13.
107. The EEOC declares that in looking for possible discriminatory intent, it "will review all
available evidence, including the respondents' collective bargaining history and employment
practices." EEOC Interpretive Memorandum, July 12, 1977, 2 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) f
5029. The Commission also declares that it will infer discriminatory intent in the adoption of a
departmental seniority system if unions or departments were originally segregated. Id. Both
pronouncements fairly reflect the Quarles facts, which the Court apparently found sufficient to
deprive a seniority system of § 703(h) protection.
On the other hand, the EEOC threatens to infer the relevant sort of discriminatory purpose if
an employer or union has reason to know that their seniority system locks minorities or women
into less advantageous positions and "the system is renegotiated or maintained when an
alternative system is available." Id. It is'not at all clear that such circumstances satisfy the
Teamsters-Evans standard of proof. The scienter required by the EEOC's rule was certainly
present in Evans.
108. The EEOC affirmatively states that it does not consider § 703(h) to immunize a
seniority system when the employer or union has failed to follow the system in allocating
benefits. Id. at n.2.
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ington v. Davis. 1o9 In Davis, the Court reviewed a decision of the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia that applied Title VII standards to a
request for summary judgment on an employment discrimination claim
arising under the equal protection clause and section 1981 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866.110 The District of Columbia Police Department had
rejected plaintiffs' applications for employment on the basis of a personnel
test that excluded a disproportionately high number of black applicants. 11
Plaintiffs based a charge of discrimination in hiring on this disproportionate
impact and on the allegation that the test was not significantly related to job
performance; they did not allege discriminatory intent. The court of appeals
held that plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment should have been granted
on fifth amendment grounds alone. Griggs would have required such a
result if the case had arisen under Title VII, which did not apply to the
federal government at the time the complaint was filed, but previous
constitutional decisions concerning employment discrimination had not dis-
tinguished the constitutional from the statutory standard.11 2 The Court re-
jected this reasoning and asserted instead that state action is not "uncon-
stitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact," 113 when
no racially discriminatory purpose is established. Disproportionate impact is
some evidence of discriminatory purpose, and a discriminatory purpose may
be inferred from the totality of relevant facts, including the fact that a
disproportionate impact under the circumstances is inexplicable but for
discriminatory purpose. In other than exceptional cases, however, statistical
evidence of discrimination is not enough. 114 Clearly, Teamsters and Evans
adopted the same rule for seniority system challenges under Title VII. 115
109. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
III. Whether the number of black applicants who failed the test was disproportionately high
was disputed. Plaintiffs produced evidence that a higher percentage of blacks than of whites
failed the test. On the other hand, the percentage of blacks among those recruited since 1969
was roughly equal to the percentage of blacks between ages 20 and 29 living within the territory
on which the recruitment program concentrated. 426 U.S. at 235.
112. Washington v. Davis, 512 F.2d 956,958 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
113. 426 U.S. at 239 (emphasis in original).
114. Id. at 242.
115. This does not mean that the Court had read seniority system discrimination out of the
Act, since most employers subject to Title VII are nongovernmental and equal protection would
not ordinarily bind them. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), lends
support to this analogy. There the Court examined a claim that a single-family-unit zoning
ordinance violated the equal protection clause by virtually excluding minorities from the
village. The Court held this evidence of disproportionate impact legally insufficient. Elaborat-
ing on the requirement of proof of discriminatory motive, Justice Powell said that if the
respondent's property had suddenly been rezoned after respondent's announcement that it
intended to erect low-cost multifamily housing, "we would have a far different case." Id. at
267. This hypothetical situation is similar to the one presented by a seniority system that has its
genesis in discrimination.
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Despite the clear conceptual precedent for the Teamsters-Evans bur-
den-of-proof rule, the rule provides blurry guidance for seniority cases. Two
months after those cases came down, the Second Circuit announced its
decision in Cates v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. ,116 which factually resem-
bled Evans. Plaintiffs were black airline pilots with defendant, TWA. Two
had been furloughed or laid off pursuant to the seniority system provided for
in a collective bargaining agreement between the airline and the other
defendant, the Air Line Pilots Association. The third plaintiff feared that he
too would be furloughed. All three filed charges with the EEOC in 1972,
alleging that TWA had followed a discriminatory hiring policy during the
first years after the effective date of Title VII and that TWA and the union
jointly had maintained a seniority system that preserved the effects of the
prior hiring discrimination. Plaintiffs sought a revision of their seniority
assignments to reflect the dates at which they were qualified for employment
with the airline. The EEOC charges, however, were not filed within 180
days of their initial employment when seniority positions were assigned, nor
within 180 days after the layoff, and by 1970 the airline had stopped hiring
new pilots altogether, so that the discriminatory hiring policy was no longer
in effect. Resting its decision squarely on Evans, the court of appeals
affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the complaint, and noted that
plaintiffs did not claim that the seniority system lacked bona fides or was not
operated neutrally. Since a claim based on the earlier discrimination in
hiring was clearly time-barred, the court concluded that no claim had been
stated. Arguably, the allegations raised a question whether the seniority
system was intentionally discriminatory. 117 At the time the complaint was
filed, only fourteen of the airline's 4468 pilots, on regular service or on
furlough, were black; all of the black pilots were hired after the effective
date of Title VII. 118 The employer's continued adherence to the seniority
system, which was presumably reaffirmed in collective bargaining agree-
ments after the effective date of Title VII, surely exhibited a knowing
acceptance of the black pilot's layoff jeopardy. The question of discriminat-
or intent is difficult here because the seniority system, like that in Evans,
was nondepartmental, yet all members of the affected minority group were
significantly disadvantaged by its operation. But, the female flight atten-
dants in Evans who had been forced to resign under the discriminatory "no
marriage" rule were at least given an opportunity to seek prompt adjustment
of their seniority positions under a collective bargaining agreement. 119 The
116. 561 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1977).
117. Id. at 1072.
118. Brief for Appellant at 4-5, Cates v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 561 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir.
1977).
119. See text accompanying notes 77-78 supra.
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court of appeals should have weighed this difference carefully in the light of
Teamsters' recognition that a genesis in discrimination deprives a seniority
system of section 703(h) protection. Instead, it apparently assumed that
since the facts of Cates otherwise resembled those of Evans, only the
neutrality of the seniority system needed to be examined. 120
IV. The National Labor Policy and "Normal Equitable Considerations"
A. The Collective Bargaining Relationship
Seniority system challenges under Title VII involve the interests of
employees who have suffered discrimination, their fellow employees who
have not, and the employers and unions whose divergent interests meet in
the adoption of seniority systems. In a sense, these interests of individuals
are reflected as governmental interests, whose definition must be found in
Title VII and the Taft-Hartley Act.121 It would be more realistic to describe
these governmental interests as governmental projects, precariously initiated
by the legislature, but entrusted for success or failure to the judiciary. Yet
the courts have for the most part silently passed over the inevitable jostling
of the national policies relating to collective bargaining and employment
discrimination in the seniority cases. The new direction announced in
Teamsters and Evans arguably leads to a proper adjustment of these
concerns.
The analogy between the burden-of-proof rule of section 703(h) and the
equal protection rule adopted in Davis suggests that the Court may have
sought to reconcile the policy against employment discrimination with a
concern for the collective bargaining relationship. The law of equal protec-
tion has evolved against the background of judicial deference to legislative
discretion. 122 The Court has steadfastly refused to find discriminatory state
action when classifications built into a statute or implicit in state policy or
custom bore a reasonable relationship to proper legislative goals. 123 Davis
stands for the proposition that even when the statutory singling out of a
given class would present a suspect classification and shift the burden of
proof in an equal protection action from members of that class to the
government, proof that state action adversely affects more members of that
120. Evans may provide support for this. In a footnote to his discussion of the neutrality of
United's seniority system, Justice Stevens pointed out that the case "does not present the
question raised in the so-called departmental seniority cases. See, e.g., Quarles v. Philip
Morris, 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968). 431 U.S. at 558 n.10. This statemnent may be
interpreted as implying that only departmental seniority systems raise the issue of genesis in
discrimination.
121. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1970).
122. See, e.g., Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U.S. 571, 577 (1915).
123. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 495 (1974).
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class than other classes shifts the burden only in unusual circumstances. 124
The Davis rule is significant because it denies that statistics alone can show
prima facie that a governmental policy indirectly relies on a suspect classifi-
cation. Consequently, the Davis rule can be understood either as an applica-
tion of the rational relationship test to situations in which a suspect classifi-
cation is not overtly used, or as a.refinement of the rule of proof applicable
to suspect classifications. In either guise, the rule further implements judicial
deference to legislative discretion. Adoption of a similar rule in the context
of a challenge to a seniority system therefore suggests judicial deference to
the judgment of the framers of seniority provisions-the collective bargain-
ing partners in their roles as lawmakers for units of "industrial self-govern-
ment." 125
The scheme of the national labor policy centers on the roles of manage-
ment and labor organizations as collective bargaining partners in ways that
give legal significance to their characterization as lawmakers. Fundamental
to the interpretation of the Taft-Hartley Act is the idea that while employers
and duly recognized unions are required to bargain in good faith concerning
subjects properly related to employment,12 6 administrative and judicial over-
sight of that duty stops short of imposing substantive terms of agreement
upon the bargaining partners.127 Their own administration of a collective
bargaining agreement requires a continuing duty to bargain in good faith, so
that this primary discretion of employers and unions as well as the qualified
prohibition of governmental interference persists throughout the life of the
agreement. 128 Accordingly, provisions calling for arbitration of grievances
received judicial backing at a time when, despite the doctrine of "the law of
the contract," courts often refused to enforce commercial arbitration provi-
sions. 129 While the freedom of collective bargaining partners is cir-
124. See 426 U.S. at 241-42 (1976).
125. A collective bargaining agreement is an effort to erect a system of industrial self-
government. When most parties enter into contractual relationship they do so volun-
tarily, in the sense that there is no real compulsion to deal with one another, as
opposed to dealing with other parties. This is not true of the labor agreement. The
choice is generally not between entering or refusing to enter into a relationship, for
that in all probability pre-exists the negotiations. Rather it is between having that
relationship governed by an agreed-upon rule of law or leaving each and every matter
subject to a temporary resolution dependent solely upon the relative strength, at any
given moment, of the contending forces.
United Steel Workers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580 (1960).
126. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (b)(3) (1970).
127. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1970) provides that the duty to bargain in good faith "does not
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession." See, e.g.,
United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1967), rev'd sub nom. H.K. Porter, Inc.
v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
128. Union News Co. v. Hildreth, 295 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1961).
129. United Steel Workers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 579 (1960).
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cumscribed, the courts' self-restraint in matters affecting the bargaining
relationship calls to mind the judicial attitude toward the separation of
powers.
If the Teamsters-Evans construction of section 703(h) suggests defer-
ence to the quasi-legislative discretion of collective bargaining partners, the
reasons for such deference in the narrow context of seniority system chal-
lenges are slight. Employers and unions should be free within limits to shape
seniority provisions to suit the bargaining unit. This freedom, however,
would not be less if provision were made to halt the perpetuation of seniority
disadvantages due to past discrimination; 130 as Justice Brennan observed in
Franks, parties challenging a seniority system under Title VII often "do not
ask modification or elimination of the existing seniority system, but only an
award of the seniority status they would have individually enjoyed under the
present system but for [past discrimination]." 131 In those few cases in which
alteration of the seniority system would be necessary to accomodate the
claims of discriminatees, the seniority system would presumably lack neu-
trality and gain no protection from section 703(h) on the new reading of that
section.
It may be objected that while labor-management discretion in designing
seniority systems is not at stake, collectively bargained settlements of griev-
ances charging discrimination are and should have the protection of the new
reading of section 703(h). In Evans, for example, the employer and union
had tried to eradicate the lingering effects of the "no marriage" rule by
providing seniority adjustments for any of the rule's victims who had filed
grievances with the union or charges with the EEOC; 132 this effort would
have proved superfluous if stragglers like Evans could have obtained relief
by a subsequent Title VII suit. One laudable reason for a rule limiting the
litigation of seniority system challenges is to give employers and unions an
incentive for correcting discrimination and its effects. But as it is now
interpreted, section 703(h) does not practically create that incentive. The
NLRB and the courts have agreed that the Taft-Hartley Act imposes on
unions a duty of fair representation towards their members, 133 under which a
union must try to correct the kinds of discrimination that Title VII
condemns. Agreements and even arbitration between unions and employers,
130. See United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 415 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1969).
131. 424 U.S. at 758.
132. See text accompanying notes 76-77 supra.
133. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953). Huffman followed the reasoning in
Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), in which the Court found a union duty
of fair representation under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151, 152 (1970). The breach of
that duty in that case consisted of a failure to prevent racial discrimination in job assignments
and compensation.
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however, do not bar subsequent Title VII actions by discriminatees;13 the
machinery of the Taft-Hartley Act permits subsequent challenges by em-
ployees in certain circumstances.1 3 5
A more compelling argument in favor of an immunity for seniority
systems based on labor-management relations is that if union members
cannot rely on seniority rights, the position of the union may be weakened
sufficiently to jeopardize the collective bargaining relationship. Commen-
tatdrs have debunked the union defense of seniority that stresses employees'
seniority expectations."3 6 Those expectations are of course only hopes that
future business conditions may frustrate. Seniority status is not a vested
property right; 137 unions can and sometimes do alter individual employees'
seniority rankings by agreement with the employer-they may do so in
order to remove traces of past discrimination. 138 But these arguments do not
reach the issue whether a law that results in the general instability of
seniority expectations would seriously compromise union strength. An argu-
ment that does reach this issue could be based on the recent experience of
unions when numerous seniority challenges of the sort now being disqual-
ified were succeeding in the lower federal courts. Empirical studies of the
effect on unions' strength, however, are not available.
Even if Title VII seniority suits did undermine union credibility, this
result would not necessarily outweigh the purpose of making discriminatees
whole. The complete collapse of a union would make seniority adjustments
worthless, but short of that outcome the harm to a union occasioned by its
members' resentment over the loss of seniority status because the union or
employer has discriminated against other employees may command little
sympathy. A judgment that the value of fostering unions overrides the
inequity of leaving discriminatees to their plight would need the support of a
more comprehensive policy in favor of unions than that embodied in the
Taft-Hartley Act. 139
Nor does Title VII contain exemptions designed to protect unions or the
collective bargaining relationship in other important respects. Hiring hall
arrangements, for example, receive no protection. 14° Labor-management
agreements affecting other hiring methods, promotion, transfer, and the
prevention of unjustified discharge, even if these agreements are traditional
134. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
135. See § 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185; Humphrey v.
Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
136. Cooper & Sobol, supra note 23, at 1604-07.
137. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337-39 (1953).
138. See text accompanying note 130 supra.
139. One need only mention § 14(b) permitting state "right to work" laws. 29 U.S.C. §
164(b) (1970).
140. United States v. IBEW, Local 38, 428 F.2d 144.(6th Cir. 1970).
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in the industry and pass muster under NLRB precedents, are subject to
timely Title VII challenge when they involve discrimination on a prohibited
basis.141 Arbitration of labor disputes is not entitled to deference in this
area. 142 Moreover, the higher priority of the antidiscrimination policy ap-
pears affirmatively from the face of Title VII, and the Court has shown no
inclination to alter this priority. 143 The legislative history that Teamsters
rehearsed did express concern for the possible harm Title VII could do to
labor's interests, but it should be remembered that "big labor" sympathized
with Title VII in its original form, and that legislators not known for their
alignment with union causes were the only ones to express anxiety over its
effect on seniority rights.14
B. Reverse Discrimination and Fairness to Discriminatees
The Court's ingenious view that sections 703(h) and 706(g) are wholly
independent obscures, if it does not vitiate, the only remaining policy
arguments that favor the new reading of section 703(h), arguments based on
a concern for equitable treatment of all employees with a stake in a seniority
system. A plaintiff's seniority relief translates directly into other employees'
forfeiture. The rules of Franks, Teamsters, and Evans do not seem to
respond to the question whether equity should always or sometimes preclude
reallocation of benefits on the ground that it entails reverse discrimination. It
is plausible, however, to regard Teamsters and Evans as deliberately
qualifying Franks' generosity towards discriminatees, a result that might be
desirable on equitable grounds. While under Franks any Title VII violation
with seniority consequences will support a request for seniority relief, most
violations are short-lived and the new reading of section 703(h) prevents the
treatment of seniority systems as artificial life-supports. Thus, we must now
consider whether the Court's roundabout method of minimizing the period
during which seniority relief is obtainable coherently answers the demands
of equity.
These equitable demands can be set out partly in terms of an answer to
the issue of reverse discrimination. Proponents of the broadest view of
seniority system violations argue that the seniority expectations of employ-
ees who would suffer if the seniority of discriminatees were increased are
illegitimate. 145 Only rarely is a distinction drawn between employees whose
141. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (c) (1970).
142. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
143. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Corp., 424 U.S. 747, 778,778 n.40 (1976); 118 CONG. REC.
7166, 7168 (1972).
144. Vaas, supra note 23, at 436.
145. Cooper & Sobol, supra note 23, at 1605-06; Note, supra note 8, at 401-02.
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bargaining agent participated in the discrimination and employees who were
not even remotely culpable. 146 In either case, the employees' seniority
expectations are hopes of gain that rest ultimately on the discrimination. A
traditional equitable approach would distinguish knowing accomplices from
unwitting beneficiaries. 47 The Teamsters and Evans holdings draw at best
a very rough version of that distinction. If we consider only seniority
systems that result from collective bargaining, the requirement that a plain-
tiff show a discriminatory purpose behind the system's adoption restricts
violations to instances in which the most senior employees will have had
reason to know, when the system is adopted, that the union was treating
minority or female employees unfairly. Yet deliberate discrimination in the
design of a seniority system implicates unionized employees no more than
do other forms of union discrimination-for example, the union's failure to
prosecute grievances alleging discriminatory discharge-that have seniority
consquences but will not support a seniority system challenge under Team-
sters and Evans.
When the time period for asserting a claim is severely limited, another
equitable concern is that the potential claimant should have a clear knowl-
edge of his injury during the whole time period. A person whose place on a
seniority roster is low because of past discrimination may be unable to
determine at the time his or her name is added to the roster whether the
consequences will be slight or severe. 148 Competitive seniority usually
controls extremely different kinds of employment benefits, such as layoff
and opportunity to select routes. 14 9 If layoff is highly unlikely, a dis-
criminatee may reasonably.not value other seniority benefits enough to seek
a seniority adjustment. There is also a serious likelihood that many dis-
criminatees would not immediately recognize a wrongful seniority assign-
ment as a form of employment discrimination for which Title VII provides a
cure.
While the new reading of section 703(h) does not attune seniority
system challenges to the finer points of traditional equity just examined, it
does provide major protection for the seniority rights threatened by Title
VII. The measure of that protection is perhaps illogical, since the exception-
al circumstances under which a seniority system will now be understood to
lose section 703(h) immunity bear only a rough relation to the question
146. Id. at 1605.
147. In his separate opinion in Franks, Chief Justice Burger compares unwitting employee
accomplices to holders in due course of negotiable instruments. 424 U.S. at 781.
148. This was the case in Cates v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 561 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1977).
See text accompanying notes 124-25 supra.
149. Stacy, supra note 8, at 490.
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whether those who gain by existing seniority rankings had a part in the
discrimination against potential complainants. 150 The protection is more
generous to the former than to the latter, however, which comports with the
view that its purpose is the avoidance of what might be considered reverse
discrimination. A consciousness of that purpose pervades the partly concur-
ring, partly dissenting opinions of three justices in Franks. 151 It is relevant
to note that in those opinions the phrase "reverse discrimination" does not
occur; neither Teamsters nor Evans so much as hint at the problem of
reverse discrimination, under any description. The explanation no doubt is
that the Court would prefer to particularize rather than to call attention to
this central and politically inflammatory aspect of antidiscrimination law.
The Court's interpretation of section 703(h) will probably save the Court
any future encounters with the issue of reverse discrimination under Title
VII.
Stephen Utz
150. Justice Powell's proposal in Franks coupled with a more permissive reading of § 703(h)
would be preferable. See text accompanying notes 46-49 supra.
151. See text accompanying notes 44-49 supra.
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